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Abstract 19 
Infanticide by primate males was considered rare if groups contain more than one adult male 20 
because, owing to lower paternity certainty, a male should be less likely to benefit from 21 
infanticide. Guided by recent evidence for strong variation of infanticide in primate multi-22 
male groups, we modelled the conditions for when infanticide should occur for a group with a 23 
resident and an immigrant male. Setting the parameters (e.g. infant mortality, reduction of 24 
interbirth interval, life-time reproductive success, genetic representation) to fit the conditions 25 
  2
most commonly found in nature, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the influence 1 
of age and dominance on the occurrence of infanticide and infant defence. Male age strongly 2 
impacts the likelihood of an attack which is modified by the father’s defence. If the new male 3 
is dominant he is likely to attack under most circumstances whereas a subordinate male will 4 
only attack if the father does not defend. These model scenarios fit the conditions under 5 
which infanticide is known to occur in primate multi-male groups and offer an explanation 6 
why infanticide is common in some multi-male groups and rare in others. Overall, the 7 
benefits for infanticidal males are strongly governed by a reduced interbirth interval while 8 
advantages via improved genetic representation in the gene pool contribute but a minor 9 
fraction. 10 
 11 
Introduction 12 
The killing of infants by conspecific males has been reported for many animal species, 13 
mostly mammals, and seems to be particularly frequent in primates (e.g. Hausfater & Hrdy, 14 
1984; Parmigiani & vom Saal, 1994; Ebensperger, 1998; Janson & van Schaik, 2000; van 15 
Schaik, 2000a). Of the five explanatory hypotheses put forward to explain infanticide 16 
(overview e.g. in Hrdy, 1979; Hausfater & Vogel, 1982), the most pertinent has proven to be 17 
the sexual selection hypothesis, which attributes infanticide to male-male competition for 18 
reproduction (Hrdy, 1974). According to this hypothesis, killing of an infant results in 19 
reproductive advantage for male mammals under the following conditions: 1) only unrelated 20 
infants are killed; 2) premature loss of an infant enables the mother to conceive the next 21 
infant sooner; 3) the males’ chances of siring the next infant are high. In addition, it has been 22 
argued that by killing an unrelated infant, males increase their own relative, genetic 23 
representation in the population simply because they reduce the genetic representation of a 24 
competing male (Hrdy, 1974; Hausfater & Vogel, 1982). While this is certainly true, the 25 
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magnitude of such an indirect benefit has not been explored and its importance especially in 1 
relation to a reduced interbirth interval is not clear. 2 
Most data for primates (van Schaik, 2000b), carnivores (Pusey & Packer, 1994) and 3 
rodents (Blumstein, 2000) support the sexual selection hypothesis. They mainly refer to 4 
groups containing only one breeding male called one-male groups. From time to time, this 5 
male is replaced by a new male (e.g. Struhsaker, 1977; Sommer, 1988) who may attack and 6 
eventually kill infants. Mothers and other group members usually defend the infant and 7 
female-female coalitions are common in this context. However, male defence is considered 8 
more efficient and riskier to the attacker than female defence (Hrdy, 1974; van Schaik, 9 
2000b) but in one-male groups the father will no longer be around to protect his progeny. 10 
 Previous models (Chapman & Hausfater, 1979; Hausfater et al., 1982; Breden & 11 
Hausfater, 1990) mainly referred to the best data available at that time, the records for 12 
Hanuman langurs (Semnopithecus (Presbytis) entellus) living at three different sites in India 13 
(Sugiyama, 1965; Mohnot, 1971; Hrdy, 1977). Perhaps because in these populations the one-14 
male group type predominates, the models likewise assume one-male settings. Infanticide in 15 
multi-male groups was observed but considered to be less likely (e.g. Busse and Hamilton, 16 
1981; Sekulic, 1983; Leland et al., 1984; Newton, 1988; van Schaik, 1996) because potential 17 
male defenders will increase the costs for and reduce the success rates of attackers. The 18 
chances seem smaller for an infanticidal male to sire the next infant and thus to benefit from 19 
infanticide. He risks killing his own offspring particularly if mating skew is low and male 20 
tenure is long. 21 
 It has recently been confirmed that infanticide may indeed occur in primate multi-male 22 
groups (e.g. de Ruiter et al., 1994; Borries, 1997; Palombit et al., 2000; Soltis et al., 2000) 23 
and that it may be in accordance with the sexual selection hypothesis (Borries et al., 1999a; 24 
Crockett & Janson, 2000). Males already residing in the group were observed to defend 25 
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infants (Borries et al., 1999b; Palombit et al., 2000). The data now available reveal a large 1 
variation in the occurrence of infanticide within and between primate populations (cf. Janson 2 
& van Schaik, 2000). For instance, in some multi-male groups, no or less than about 10 % of 3 
all live-born infants are killed and infanticide does not account for more than 20 % of infant 4 
mortality (e.g. Macaca spp., Papio anubis, Papio cynocephalus). In other species (e.g. Papio 5 
ursinus, Propithecus diadema, Semnopithecus entellus) more than 10 % of all infants born 6 
fall victim to infanticide, accounting for over 30 % of the infant mortality. It is suggested that 7 
the number of adult males per group, male replacement rates and age at weaning are 8 
important factors contributing to this variation (e.g. Borries & Koenig, 2000; Janson & van 9 
Schaik, 2000). However, other factors may be equally or even more important. It is possible 10 
that low rates of infanticide are common in species where immigrant males enter at the 11 
bottom of the males’ dominance hierarchy and it takes several years of residency to climb to 12 
the top, resulting in large age and rank differences between new immigrants and residents 13 
(e.g. Sprague et al., 1998; van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 2001). Accordingly, high rates could 14 
prevail when new males attain top rank right after immigration (e.g. Borries, 2000; Palombit 15 
et. al., 2000). These newcomers tend to be young adult males so that depending on 16 
immigration rates, rank and age differences may be comparatively small. Thus the mode of 17 
male immigration may act on the relative age and rank of competing males in multi-male 18 
groups. Paternity certainty, actual paternity (reproductive skew), residual reproductive value, 19 
risk of being injured in a conflict and with these the costs and benefits of infanticide and 20 
infants defence should depend upon age and rank in a predictable way. Hence, the effects of 21 
age and rank can be explored theoretically. 22 
 The present paper addresses these questions via mathematical modelling. Specifically: 23 
What are the conditions for the occurrence of infanticide and infant defence by males living 24 
in multi-male groups? We look at the simplest multi-male situation, that of a group 25 
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containing two males. We will particularly consider the impact and relative importance of 1 
male age and dominance rank, a reduced interbirth interval, and alterations in the relative 2 
gene frequencies in the gene pool. Although we refer to non-human primates, the model can 3 
be adapted to the parameter settings of other mammalian species. 4 
 5 
The Model 6 
GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 7 
We consider the smallest multi-male group possible. It is composed of two adult males, a 8 
variable number of adult females and one infant, the potential target of infanticide. There may 9 
be additional infants but we concentrate on this particular one. One of the males has been 10 
resident for some time and is or assumes that he is the father of the infant. He will be called 11 
the father (f). The other male has recently migrated into the group. He is not the father of the 12 
infant and may attempt to attack and kill it. He is called the new male (n). We do not assume 13 
conscious processes here, but generalize from field observations (Borries et al., 1999b). On 14 
the one hand, males who mate with a female during her conceptional period sometimes 15 
subsequently defend her infant. On the other hand, males who did not mate then are never 16 
observed to defend the infant, and sometimes attack it. In particular, each male has two 17 
strategies available to him. The new male can either attempt infanticide or not, and if an 18 
attempt is made, the father can defend the infant or not. The game can thus be expressed as an 19 
extensive form game with sequential decision-making (Selten, 1983). The new male makes 20 
his decision first, the father second; thus using the standard dynamic programming technique, 21 
we find the optimal strategy of the father conditional upon an attack being made, the new 22 
male then being able to choose whether to attack or not, depending upon what strategy the 23 
father will play. It should be noted that real behaviour may be more complex with several 24 
stages of escalation possible and that we have reduced the process to the simplest case, which 25 
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retains the key features of whether to attack and whether to defend in the face of an attack. 1 
This yields a composite evolutionarily stable strategy, which tells us how a male in either 2 
position should behave, under any circumstances. 3 
 Infanticide may involve several unsuccessful attacks by the male (e.g. Borries, 1997; 4 
Palombit et al., 2000; Soltis et al., 2000). In our model an attack is thus defined as the whole 5 
period from the moment when the new male begins to attack the infant until he either gives 6 
up permanently or kills it. It is further assumed that the mother and possibly some of the other 7 
females try to defend the infant so that there is always some risk involved in attacking an 8 
infant. 9 
 10 
DEFINING MALE BENEFITS 11 
We consider the expected reward E to either male as a function of the expected number of his 12 
infants, i, which reach maturity and the total (effective) population size, y, composed of all 13 
individuals in direct competition with each other as part of the same gene pool. 14 
E(i,y) = iR(y) 15 
where R is a competition function which decreases as y increases. As the population gets 16 
larger, there is more competition and thus reduced representation. 17 
 All benefits are given relative to those at the current population size x. An infant which 18 
reaches maturity when the population size is x is worth payoff 1 to its father. Thus we set  19 
R(x) = 1 . This standardisation is possible since R(x) only influences our analysis through the 20 
factor I which depends upon the relative size of R(x) and R(x-1) only (see Table 1). 21 
 If there is sufficient food, so that competition over food is irrelevant and the population 22 
has room to increase in numbers, then strict numbers are more important than the proportion 23 
of the gene pool and so 24 
R(y) = 1, independent of y. 25 
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 However, if the population cannot expand as is the case for most natural populations that 1 
live close to the carrying capacity, the proportion of the gene pool becomes more important 2 
and R(y) is proportional 3 
to 
y
1  i.e. R(y) = 
y
x . 4 
 Reality may lie somewhere between these two extremes i.e. 5 
)1()( ϕϕ −+=
y
xyR  6 
with 0 < ϕ < 1, a constant factor; the larger the value of ϕ, the more intense the competition. 7 
 8 
PARAMETERS 9 
The general characteristics of the model population are given in Table 1. These parameters 10 
will obviously vary according to species, dominance effects, number of females etc.  It is 11 
likely that: 12 
g(t) is a decreasing function of t, tending to 0 for large t. The younger a dependent infant 13 
dies, the shorter the inter-birth interval of its mother (Altmann et al., 1977; Sommer, 14 
1994; Borries, 1997); 15 
the injury probabilities q1, q3 are relatively small. In fact, very few cases are reported for 16 
primates (van Schaik, 2000b); 17 
ν > q1 + q2 so that the probability of the infant being killed is reduced (markedly) if the 18 
father defends. Here we follow the assumption of several researchers (e.g. Altmann, 1990; 19 
Newton & Dunbar, 1994; van Schaik, 1996); 20 
Af+Ef+α+β(t) is the father’s total expected number of infants surviving to maturity (for the 21 
new male it is An+En). This formula gives his lifetime reproductive success, if no 22 
infanticide or injury results from the present encounter (if infanticide or injury does occur, 23 
then these formulas vary according to Table 2); 24 
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the ratio of expected to existing offspring varies with the age of the males and A > E for 1 
an old male while A < E for a young male; 2 
a male’s rank will act on the paternity probability and on the risk of injury with p being 3 
small, q1 > q3 if the father is subordinate and p being large, q1 < q3 if the father is 4 
dominant while p will be intermediate, q1 = q3 if there is no rank effect. 5 
 6 
BENEFITS UNDER DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES 7 
In case an attack occurs and the father defends, both males are faced with a particular risk of 8 
being injured. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that injury is equivalent to disappearance 9 
or death of the adult male and a residual reproductive value E of zero, an extreme though 10 
likely consequence in primates (e.g. Sommer, 1988). If the father is injured during defence, 11 
the infant is killed, while if the new male is injured the infant survives. The lifetime 12 
reproductive success of each of the two males under the different circumstances is 13 
summarized in Table 2. It is composed of the number of already existing offspring A plus the 14 
future offspring E, modified by the competition function R. Furthermore, if the target infant 15 
survives (no or unsuccessful attack) it is added to the father’s reproductive success modified 16 
by its chances to survive α+β(t). If the target infant is killed an extra infant is added to either 17 
male with probability equal to g(t), modified by the newborn infant’s probability of survival α 18 
and by the probability of paternity p. Competition in the population is reduced to R(x-1). 19 
 We now find the conditions for infanticide and infant defence, i.e. two conditions are 20 
distinguished in the model population: 21 
A. Condition A indicates under which circumstances it is best for the father to defend if there 22 
is an attack. If A  holds, this implies that the father should defend the infant whereas, if 23 
A holds ( A does not hold), he should not. 24 
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B. Condition B indicates when it is best for the new male to attack, assuming there will be 1 
defence by the father. If there will be no defence then there remains only the risk of injury 2 
via female defence, which for reasons of simplicity is assumed to be zero, so an attack 3 
would always be best (but see below). If B holds, this implies that the new male should 4 
attack the infant, whereas if B holds, he should not. 5 
 This argument generates three possible situations: 6 
(1) A ⇒  new male attacks, father does not defend 7 
(2) ⇒BAI  new male attacks, father defends 8 
(3) ⇒BAI  new male does not attack 9 
 Weighting the various possible rewards from Table 2 by the probability of their 10 
occurrence, the reward to the father is, 11 
q1AfR(x-1)+q2[Ef+Af+g(t)pα]R(x-1)+q3(Ef+Af+α+β(t))R(x)+(1-q1-q2-q3)(Ef+Af+α+β(t))R(x) 12 
if he defends, and ν [Ef+Af+g(t)pα]R(x-1)+(1-ν)(Ef+Af+α+β(t))R(x) if he does not. A occurs if 13 
the benefit to the father is greater if he defends than if he does not, i.e. 14 
q1AfR(x-1)+q2[Ef+Af+g(t)pα]R(x-1)+q3(Ef+Af+α+β(t))R(x)+(1-q1-q2-q3)(Ef+Af+α+β(t))R(x) > 15 
ν [Ef+Af+g(t)pα]R(x-1)+(1-ν)(Ef+Af+α+β(t))R(x) 16 
⇒ (Ef+Af+α+β(t))[R(x)-R(x-1)](ν-q1-q2)-(α+β(t))R(x-1)(q1+q2-ν)-q1EfR(x-1)+g(t)pαR(x-1)(q2-17 
ν) > 0 18 
Setting 
)1(
)()1(
−
−−
=
xR
xRxRI  implies that A occurs if 19 
(Ef+Af+α+β(t))(ν-q1-q2)I+g(t)pα(ν-q2)-[(α+β(t))(ν-q1-q2)-q1Ef] < 0 20 
 B occurs if the benefit to the new male is greater if he attacks, assuming that the father 21 
defends, than if he does not attack. Similarly weighting the rewards from Table 2 for the new 22 
male,  we obtain B if 23 
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q1(En+An+g(t)α)R(x-1)+q2(En+An+g(t)(1-p)α)R(x-1)+q3AnR(x)+(1-q1-q2-q3)(En+An)R(x) > 1 
(En+An)R(x) 2 
⇒ (En+An)(q1+q2)[R(x-1)-R(x)]-q3EnR(x)+g(t)αR(x-1)[q1+q2(1-p)] > 0 3 
dividing by R(x-1) ⇒ [(En+An)(q1+q2)+q3En] I+g(t)α[q1+q2(1-p)]-q3En > 0 4 
 These inequalities indicate how the values of the different parameters influence the 5 
likelihood of the new male to attack and the father to defend (Table 3). Of course, some of 6 
these parameters are not independent and are heavily influenced by the dominance ranks of 7 
the males. This is apparent in the following examples which illustrate some of the key 8 
predictions of the model. 9 
The above inequalities A and B are linear in the terms g(t) and I and so these terms affect 10 
the propensity for attack and defence in a straightforward way. Fixing all the above 11 
parameters in the two equations (i.e. leaving them at a constant value while varying the 12 
chosen ones) reveals that both attack and no defence are favoured by larger I and larger g(t), 13 
so that infanticide is more likely the larger these are. Since the new male’s gain (through g(t)) 14 
is largest for small values of t, males should preferentially attack young infants. Note that for 15 
the father, the loss is larger for older infants (their survival rate is better) so that defence is 16 
more important then. The difference in competition due to the death of a single individual (I) 17 
is largest for a population low in number, with a small gene pool. 18 
 19 
Examples 20 
To explore the effect of male age and dominance on the occurrence of attack and defence and 21 
to simulate natural scenarios for different primate species we calculate several examples. In 22 
these examples the following factors are considered constant. ϕ is set to equal 1. The 23 
population size is moderate (x = 1000) resulting in a value of the competition function 24 
 
y
yR 1000)( =  i.e. 
)999(
)1000()999(
R
RRI −= = 0.001 . 25 
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 The probability of survival to maturity for newborn infants is set to α = 0.5, a value most 1 
commonly found in undisturbed primate populations (e.g. Altmann et al., 1978; Borries & 2 
Koenig, 2000; Palombit et al., 2000). The probability of survival to maturity for the target 3 
infant provided there is no infanticide varies with age of the infant with β(t) = 0.2t  and  t<2 . 4 
Note that the oldest monkey killed by a male was 18 months old and the oldest ape 21 months 5 
(van Schaik, 2000b) and most monkeys terminate infancy before turning two years of age. 6 
The expected number of extra births if infanticide occurs is g(t) = 0.5-0.25t    t<2 (cf. above).  7 
It is reported in Sommer (1994) that out of 110 infants exposed to a new male in single male 8 
groups (so that only female defence was available), 53 were observed to be attacked of which 9 
39 were killed (35% of the total, 74% of those seen to be attacked). Given that many attacks 10 
go unobserved, but all fatalities are observed, 74% is likely to be a significant overestimate of 11 
the success percentage. In our examples we set the probability that the target infant is killed if 12 
only females defend as ν = 0.5. Both males are assumed to have a similar life-time 13 
reproductive success of Ef+Af = En+An = 5, a likely mean value for stable primate populations 14 
which usually contain more adult females than adult males. In fact the father’s life-time 15 
reproductive success is Af+Ef+α+β(t) and so is a little higher than the new male’s. 16 
 All other factors vary depending on the age and rank of the males. Age affects the 17 
residual reproductive value (E), while rank is assumed to affect the relative probability of 18 
being injured (q1 and q3), the probability that the infant is killed q1+q2 if the father defends, 19 
and the reproductive skew expressed via p. 20 
 21 
EXAMPLES 1 – MALES EVENLY MATCHED (SAME RANK) 22 
 Under some conditions male reproductive success does not depend on dominance (e.g. 23 
Shively & Smith, 1985; Berard et al., 1993; Paul & Kuester, 1996). Even though most of 24 
these paternity data stem from captive or semi-free ranging primates, in some societies male 25 
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dominance rank seems of little importance (Strier, 1994). Similar rank implies identical risk 1 
of injury and identical paternity probability. Hence, q1 = q3 = 0.02, q2 = 0.38 (so q1+q2 = 0.4), 2 
p = 0.5. For these examples, the two conditions thus reduce to A occurs if  3 
0.1(5.5+0.2t)*0.001+0.03(0.5-0.25t)-[0.1(0.5+0.2t)-0.02Ef]= -0.03445+0.02 Ef -0.02748t < 0 4 
and B occurs if 5 
[2+0.02En] *0.001+0.105(0.5-0.25t)-0.02En =0.0545-0.01998 En -0.02625t > 0 6 
Because there is no a priori justification for male age we explore the effect of age of the two 7 
males on defence and attack patterns for all four extreme combinations: 8 
(i) Both males are young, Ef = En = 4; 9 
then A: -0.03445+0.02*4-0.02748t < 0 ⇒  t > 1.66 10 
 B: 0.0545-0.01998*4-0.02625t > 0 ⇒  B does not hold 11 
i.e. t < 1.66 new male attacks, father does not defend; t > 1.66 no attack. 12 
(ii) Both males are old, Ef = En = 1; then A always holds, B holds if t < 1.32 13 
i.e. t < 1.32 new male attacks, father defends; t > 1.32 no attack. 14 
(iii) The father is old, the new male young, Ef = 1, En = 4; then  A always holds, B does not 15 
hold i.e. there is no attack. 16 
(iv) The father is young, the new male old, Ef = 4, En = 1; then A holds if t > 1.66,  17 
B holds if  t < 1.32 i.e. t < 1.66 new male attacks, father does not defend;  t > 1.66 no attack. 18 
 These examples show that the defence of fathers depends on their residual reproductive 19 
value. If it is low, the value of the target infant might become decisive. In other words older 20 
fathers are more likely to defend young infants than younger fathers. The latter may only 21 
defend old infants. Male attack similarly depends on the residual reproductive value, i.e. B 22 
does not hold for young males and they would only attack, if fathers do not defend. In 23 
contrast, old males may attack despite defence of (old) fathers. 24 
 25 
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EXAMPLES 2 – MALES NOT EVENLY MATCHED (DIFFERENCE IN RANK) 1 
 Most studies of wild primates have shown that male reproductive success depends on 2 
dominance rank with the highest ranking male, the alpha male being most successful (e.g. de 3 
Ruiter et al., 1994; Bercovitch & Nürnberg, 1997; Gust et al., 1998; Launhardt et al., 2001). 4 
These societies may differ, however, in male migration pattern. In some populations males in 5 
their prime age immigrate and take over the alpha position from older males (Borries, 2000; 6 
Palombit et al., 2000). Depending on the turn-over rate for the alpha position, the difference 7 
in age might only be small. In other cases young males enter the hierarchy at the bottom 8 
(Sprague et al., 1998; van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 2001) or older males frequently change 9 
groups (Alberts & Altmann, 1995; Borries, 2000). Unequal dominance rank is likely to 10 
translate into different risks of injury with the dominant male facing a smaller risk. The 11 
reproductive skew (p) will also be altered. In addition, the probability that the infant is killed 12 
with no male injured (q2) may change, and with it the overall probability that the infant is 13 
killed in an attack (q1+q2). However, since this sum mainly affects the results through (ν-q1-14 
q2), we shall not alter it for simplicity. Even though other scenarios may be possible, the 15 
examples below are the most likely scenarios among nonhuman primates. In each case we 16 
return to the original conditions A and B to find the optimal behaviour. 17 
 Examples 2a - Father Subordinate. (i) The father is subordinate and old, the new male is 18 
dominant and young, with q1 = 0.03, q3 = 0.01, q2 = 0.37 (so q1+q2 = 0.4), p = 0.2, Ef = 1, En =  19 
4; then  A always holds,  B holds if  t < 1.07 i.e. t < 1.07 new male attacks, father defends; t > 20 
1.07 no attack. 21 
(ii) The father is subordinate but only slightly older than the new male who is dominant and 22 
young, with q1 = 0.03, q3 = 0.01, q2 = 0.37 (so q1+q2 = 0.4), p = 0.2, Ef = 2, En = 4; then A 23 
holds if t > 0.73,  B holds if t < 1.07 i.e. t < 0.73 new male attacks, father does not defend; 24 
0.73 < t < 1.07 new male attacks, father defends;  t > 1.07 no attack. 25 
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 If young males immigrate and attain the alpha position, they attack only young infants 1 
and they do so even if the father defends. A subordinate father defends infants of high 2 
residual reproductive value. Infants of low residual reproductive value are only defended if 3 
the father is at the end of his reproductive career. Thus under the condition of high male 4 
immigration rates of relatively young males especially young infants seem to be at risk of 5 
being killed and more so if their father is only slightly older than the new male. 6 
 Examples 2b - Father Dominant. (i) The father is dominant and old, the new male is 7 
subordinate and young, with q1 = 0.01, q3 = 0.03, q2 = 0.39 (so q1+q2 = 0.4), p = 0.8, Ef = 1, En 8 
= 4; then  A always holds, B does not hold i.e. there is no attack. 9 
(ii) The father is dominant and young, the new male is subordinate and old, with q1 = 0.01, q3 10 
= 0.03, q2 = 0.39 (so q1+q2 = 0.4), p = 0.8, Ef = 4, En = 1; then A holds if t > 0.41, B does not 11 
hold i.e. t < 0.41 new male attacks, father does not defend; t > 0.41 no attack. 12 
 Under the condition that subordinate males immigrate there is little prospect of attacks, 13 
particularly if the new males are young. Fathers are ready to defend and it especially does not 14 
pay a new young subordinate male to attack infants. Only if the father is young and the new 15 
subordinate male old may the latter attack the infant. Under such a condition a father might 16 
not defend young infants and an old male might take advantage of this condition, even if his 17 
chances of siring the next infant are low. 18 
 19 
Benefits for new males 20 
Infanticidal males will gain advantages via a reduced interbirth interval (g(t)) and the 21 
reduction in competition (I). Their relative contribution will be explored in the following. As 22 
indicated above, the benefit is given as 23 
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 The largest plausible value of I is 
x
1 , and it may well be a lot smaller. Thus, for a 2 
population of 1,000 individuals, I < 0.001. The reduced interbirth interval g(t) typically may 3 
range from 0 to 0.5 (cf. Struhsaker & Leland, 1987; van Schaik, 2000b). When the reduced 4 
interbirth interval is an important factor, the interference term is dwarfed by it, and so at most 5 
adds a small secondary benefit. For example in Example 1(i), in the case of a newborn infant, 6 
the numerical value in the equation for conditions A of the term including I is 0.00085 and the 7 
corresponding value for the term including g(t) is 0.015. Similarly, the contributions of the 8 
terms including I and g(t) in the equation for condition B are 0.00328 and 0.0525 9 
respectively. In each case the contribution of reduced interbirth interval is 16 times higher 10 
than the competition term. In the other examples the difference is even more extreme. This 11 
tendency is even stronger for larger and probably more natural population sizes. As long as 12 
there is a noticeable advantage gained via a reduction in the subsequent interbirth interval 13 
indirect benefits seem to be of minor importance. 14 
 To explore the effect of mere indirect benefits we consider g(t) ≡ 0  i.e. the interbirth 15 
interval is not reduced by infanticide. 16 
Then A becomes (Ef+Af+α+β(t))(v-q1-q2)I-[(α+β(t))(v-q1-q2)-q1Ef] < 0 17 
 B becomes [(En+An)(q1+q2)+q3En]I-q3En > 0 18 
 The father will only not defend (A not satisfied) if the 2nd term is negative, which occurs 19 
only if the father runs a large risk of injury in defence without giving much extra protection 20 
to what the female coalition would. So it is very likely that the father defends the infant. B 21 
will only occur if the new male’s risk of injury is extremely (unfeasibly) small. As soon as an 22 
even small risk of an injury being received when female defence occurs, the new male should 23 
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not attack. Since the father will defend in most scenarios, an attack seems very unlikely when 1 
the interbirth interval is not reduced. 2 
 3 
Conclusions 4 
AGE EFFECTS 5 
 Age, primarily via its effect on a male’s residual reproductive value, has a major influence 6 
on the occurrence of attacks and defence (Examples 1). In multi-male groups primarily old 7 
males should attack infants, although this trend is modified by the father’s defence. A young 8 
father will only protect older infants, thus facilitating attacks on young infants. The situation 9 
culminates when two old males are in confrontation. They will both be prepared to take high 10 
risks so that infants will always be defended, young infants will be attacked despite defence 11 
and only older infants will not be attacked. Intuitively, these results seem to make sense. 12 
Among primates, however, old males have not been reported to attack infants 13 
disproportionately. Migrating older males are often subordinate and so less likely to attack; if 14 
males beyond prime age kill infants it is usually because they have recently risen in rank 15 
(Soltis et al., 2000). The lack of support of the model is most likely due to a lack of pure age 16 
effects among primate males, since contests between evenly matched males are quite rare. 17 
Pure age effects therefore clearly deserve further attention to test this aspect of the model 18 
appropriately. 19 
 20 
DOMINANCE EFFECTS 21 
 Introducing dominance effects and with it a reproductive skew lets new males (young and 22 
dominant) attack despite defence by the father (cf. example 2a(i)). That is, it pays incoming 23 
males to attack and kill infants, especially young infants. If the age difference between father 24 
and new male is only modest (example 2a(ii)), the new male’s risk is reduced when attacking 25 
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young infants because they will not be defended by the father. For subordinate fathers 1 
defence depends on their residual reproductive value. A low value renders defence more 2 
likely. 3 
 In general any factor which has an effect on the values of our parameters will influence 4 
the optimal behaviour. A new male attaining top dominance right after immigration is typical 5 
for chacma baboons (Papio ursinus) at the Moremi Game Reserve, Botswana or Hanuman 6 
langurs (Semnopithecus entellus) of Ramnagar, Nepal (Borries, 2000; Palombit et al., 2000). 7 
Consequently infanticide is common and its impact on infant mortality is high. 8 
 The situation should be markedly different for new males immigrating as subordinates. 9 
Their decision to attack should entirely depend on the father’s behaviour and they will only 10 
attack if he does not defend which holds true for young fathers with young infants whereas 11 
old fathers will always defend. In several primate multi-male groups it is common for 12 
immigrant males to attain subordinate ranks (e.g. Macaca fuscata, Sprague et al., 1998; 13 
Macaca fascicularis, van Noordwijk & van Schaik, 2001). They are confronted with 14 
dominant and usually older resident males, circumstances for which no infanticide is 15 
predicted. And indeed, infanticide seems to be rare in these species. The reported cases of 16 
males attacking infants all happened under exceptional circumstances that seem to fit the 17 
predictions, after the four highest-ranking males (the most likely fathers) had left the group 18 
(Soltis et al., 2000) and after the attackers had rapidly risen in rank (de Ruiter et al., 1994). 19 
However, it is currently not known whether young fathers will indeed not defend very young 20 
infants. 21 
 These examples suggest that the observed variation of infanticide in primate multi-male 22 
groups may be explained by differences in male migration pattern and the resulting 23 
differences in age and dominance rank of competing males. 24 
 25 
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BALANCING BENEFITS 1 
Male benefits derived from infanticide are mainly influenced by a direct reproductive 2 
advantage attained via the prospect of siring an extra infant. The conditions under which the 3 
evolutionarily stable strategy would indicate that infanticide would occur even if it renders 4 
only an indirect advantage are rather narrowly defined: the attacker’s risk has to be very 5 
small. Perhaps the few observed cases when males attacked infants residing in neighbouring 6 
groups fit this scenario (e.g. Borries, 1997). The recently described case of infanticide in 7 
patas monkey (Erythrocebus patas, Enstam et al., 2002) might be another example for 8 
exceptional circumstances. A single male in a group of females killed an infant although the 9 
subsequent interbirth interval was not shortened in this seasonally and annually breeding 10 
species. It is likely that patas males, when alone in a group of females, face a very low risk of 11 
being injured indicated by a rather high general canine dimorphism index (GCDI) and one of 12 
the highest body weight dimorphisms amongst anthropoid primates (Plavcan and & Schaik, 13 
1992, 1997). Mere indirect advantages might, furthermore, be sufficient if the population size 14 
is very small (e.g. in populations close to extinction). It is, however, not clear whether this 15 
situation occurs in nature. 16 
 More generally, in multi-male groups with little prospect of direct benefits, a male is 17 
expected to refrain from attack if he would risk being injured. Since females almost always 18 
defend and defence by fathers is very likely (if their costs are small or moderate), new 19 
immigrant males will not attack. Mere indirect benefits are most probably not sufficient to 20 
explain the evolution of infanticide by males. 21 
 22 
PERSPECTIVES 23 
So far we have restricted our exploration to the smallest multi-male group possible, a single 24 
father and a second male as a new immigrant. The situation will be much more complex 25 
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when considering additional male residents and is strongly influenced by mating skew and 1 
paternity probability. Furthermore, the duration of male tenure (in relation to paternity 2 
probability) will act on the number of infants exposed to immigrant males and on the number 3 
of male defenders available (e.g. Borries & Koenig, 2000). Finally, immigration by male 4 
coalitions (e.g. Alouatta seniculus, Pope, 2000) and cooperative female defence in relation to 5 
female group size will affect the probability of attacks. Thus, even though the model provides 6 
a first step towards explaining variable rates and frequencies of infanticide among multi-male 7 
groups, inclusion of further variables is clearly desirable. We furthermore hope that more and 8 
detailed data will soon become available to allow the model to be tested. 9 
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Table 1. Parameters of the model population 
 
Parameter Description 
1. General parameters 
X Effective population size before any attack (see also text) 
R(y) Interference function assuming effective population size y (by a simple 
scaling we can assume R(x) = 1 for our given x) 
Af Expected number of offspring of the father to survive to maturity out 
of those which have already been born, not including the target infant 
Ef Expected number of future offspring of the father to survive to 
maturity, assuming that no infanticide occurs (equals his residual 
reproductive value, Fisher 1930) 
An Expected number of offspring of the new male to survive to maturity 
out of those which have already been born. 
En Expected number of future offspring of the new male to survive to 
maturity, assuming that no infanticide occurs, his residual reproductive 
value. 
P Probability that the mother’s next infant is sired by the original father 
if the target infant is killed and neither male is injured 
α Probability that a newborn infant survives to maturity which is 
assumed to be similar for the next infant or any extra infant born after 
infanticide and identical for both males and thus independent of 
fatherhood 
α+β(t) Probability that the target infant aged t survives to maturity if it is not 
killed in an attack, where β (t) is an increasing function of t. 
ν Probability that the infant is killed if only females defend 
2. Parameters when the father defends 
q1 Probability that the father is injured and the infant is killed 
q2 Probability that neither male is injured, but the infant is killed 
q3 Probability that the new male is injured and the infant survives 
1-q1-q2-q3 Probability that the infant survives and neither male is injured 
3. Reproductive and competitive effects 
g(t) Average number of extra births due to the death of an infant aged t 
years; for instance, if the mean interbirth interval is 2.4 years and this 
is reduced by 1.2-0.6t years on average for an infant aged t < 2 years as 
occurs in Hanuman langurs (Borries 1997), then 
g(t) = 
4.2
1 (1.2-0.6t) = 0.5-0.25t     t < 2 
)1(
)()1(
−
−−
=
xR
xRxRI  
Decrease in competition in the population after a death; it is the ratio of 
the increase in value of an individual as the population decreases from 
size x to size x-1, and the absolute value of the individual for the new 
population size. As shown in the text, the function R(y) only affects the 
optimal behavior through the value of I. 
 
Note. Parameters when the father defends exclude two possibilities (father injured and infant 
survives, and new male injured and the infant is killed) which involve a decisive victory by 
one male in their individual contest but the winner does not get his way in the fate of the 
infant which we consider unlikely and so have ignored for simplicity. 
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Table 2. Rewards for the father and the new male under different circumstances 
 
Circumstances Rewards for Probability 
New 
male 
attacks 
Father 
defends
Male 
injured 
Infant 
killed 
Father New male 
given the 
attack/defence 
situation 
No No No No (Af+Ef+α+β(t))R(x) (An+En)R(x) 1 
Yes No No Yes [Af+Ef+g(t)pα]R(x-1) [An+En+g(t)(1-p)α]R(x-1) ν 
Yes No No No (Af+Ef+α+β(t))R(x) (An+En)R(x) 1-ν 
Yes Yes Father Yes AfR(x-1) [An+En+g(t)α]R(x-1) q1 
Yes Yes No Yes [Af+Ef+g(t)pα]R(x-1) [An+En+g(t)(1-p)α]R(x-1) q2 
Yes Yes New male No (Af+Ef+α+β(t))R(x) AnR(x) q3 
Yes Yes No No (Af+Ef+α+β(t))R(x) (An+En)R(x) 1-q1-q2-q3 
  28
Table 3. The influence of parameters on attack and defense conditions 
 
Parameter 
A holds: father 
defends if 
B holds: new male 
attacks if 
α+β(t) large  
ν large  
q1 small large 
q2  large 
q3  small 
ν-q1-q2 large  
p small small (1-p = large) 
α small large 
E small small 
g(t) small large 
I small large 
 
Note. In each case "small" and "large" mean that the smaller (larger) the respective parameter 
the more likely will be attack by the new male or defence by the father. ν-q1-q2 the 
probability that the target infant survives is increased by father's defence. 
